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INTRODUCTION

Choice of law arbitrates values. When a court chooses one state's law
over another's, it is not only determining the rule of decision, it is deciding
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which state's values it should adopt. How should a court make such a
decision? Should it select the rule it thinks is the fairest? Should it adopt
its law? Or, should it remain neutral in the choice of law process and
employ the law of the jurisdiction with the closest connection to the
controversy?
Guidance in making this choice appears in recent Supreme Court cases
that comprise a new approach to the constitutional relation of
governmental units. Judge Wilkinson has proclaimed that our
constitutional jurisprudence is in a new period of judicial activism-one
in which judges are structural referees.1 The hallmark of this new judicial
activism "is an interest in reviving the structural guarantees of dual
sovereignty [vertical federalism]." 2 Judge Wilkinson has declared that
"[tiaken as a whole, the[se] decisions preserve Congress as an institution
of broad but enumerated powers, and the states as entities having residual
sovereign rights."'
Unlike the other two periods of judicial activism in this century,4 the
new judicial activism is substantively neutral. That is, "the cases of the
present era cannot be seen as single-mindedly promoting the interests of a
particular constituency."' Judge Wilkinson has added that "[a]s a matter of
oxen, the gored are determined by infringements upon our federal system,
not by judicial disdain for enacted policies."6 Thus, "[i]n the present
period, the preservation of federalism values-not the maintenance of
laissezfaire-isthe binding principle."7
Unlike the two earlier periods of judicial activism which "attempted to
remove the subject matter of those cases from political debate altogether,
... the present jurisprudence of federalism is purely allocative, standing
for the simple proposition that the Constitution does not cast states as mere
marionettes of the central government. 8 In other words, "[t]his
jurisprudence removes no substantive decision from the stage of political
1. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820,889-96 (4th Cir.) (Wilkinson,
J., concurring), cert. granted,Brzonkala v. Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (1999).
2. Id. at 893. The cases cited by Judge Wilkinson to illustrate the common thread of
contemporary judicial activism include the federalism cases cited later in this Article. See infra note
92 and accompanying text.
3. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 893.
4. The other two periods were the Lochner Era at the beginning of the century and the
Warren Court-Early Burger Court Era. See id. at 890-92. In the Lochner Era, courts struck down
progressive legislation on substantive due process grounds ("liberty of contract") and commerce
clause grounds. See id. at 890-91. In the Warren Court-Early Burger Court Era, the Court found
"new substantive rights in the Constitution and down played that document's structural mandates."
Id. at 891-92.
5. Id. at 893.
6. Id. at 894.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 895.
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debate."9 Thus,
[s]tates remain free after [New York v. UnitedStates] to reach
regional solutions to their hazardous waste problems, after
[United States v. Lopez] to criminalize the act of bringing a
firearm within a school zone, after Printz voluntarily to
cooperate with federal law enforcement efforts, and after
today's decision to provide civil remedies to women who are
battered or raped. No court blocks the path of legislative
initiative in any of these substantive areas. 10
Judge Wilkinson summed up the newjudicial activism as follows: "Instead
of aggressively pursuing substantive preferences, this court validates a
structural principle found throughout the Constitution.... Federalism is
the shining gem cut by the Founders. It remains the chief contribution of
America to democratic theory and the structural guarantor of liberty and
diversity for the American people."'"
This Article argues that the new judicial activism that Judge Wilkinson
has discerned in recent cases on vertical federalism also should apply to
other areas where the Constitution sets structural lines, and specifically to
horizontal federalism-the relation of the states. If the Court is going to
give the states more authority, it also needs to protect a state's sovereignty
from overreaching by other states. Choice of law is thus an area that affects
state sovereignty. When a judge is making a choice of law decision, that
judge is "polic[ing] the structural lines inherent" in the Constitution's
provisions concerning the relations of the states and the separation of
powers." In making this choice, the judge should respect these lines and
refrain from making substantive choices or adopting parochial law because
it is forum favoring. In other words, choice of law should be substantively
and forum neutral.
The Supreme Court has recently recognized the importance of the
structural lines of horizontal federalism in BMW of North America v.
Gore.3 In this case, the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama trial
court's punitive damages award on due process grounds. 4 Part of the
constitutional problem was that Alabama had calculated the award based
on the defendant's conduct in other states, including states in which its
conduct was not illegal.' 5 In doing so, Alabama had failed to recognize "the

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
See id. at 1604.
See id. at 1597.
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need to respect the interests of other States. 16 According to the Court, "It
follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that a State
may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent
of changing the tortfeasor's lawful conduct in other States." 7
The treatment of same-sex marriage in a multistate setting presents an
opportunity to explore how choice of law should deal with state values in
relation to the structural lines discussed above.'" With the possibility that
at least one state will legalize same-sex marriage,' 9 proponents of same-sex
marriage have advocated using choice of law to extend same-sex marriage
to otherjurisdictions. 20On the other hand, opponents of same-sex marriage
have vehemently opposed such efforts, and have proposed employing the
public policy exception to avoid recognizing such marriages. 2 This Article

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Lynn Wardle has called the controversy concerningsame-sex marriage "one of the most
significant issues in contemporary American family law." Lynn D. Wardle. A CriticalAnalysisof
Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 3. She has added that
"[piresently it is one of the most vigorously advocated reforms discussed in law reviews, one of the
most explosive political questions facing lawmakers, and one of the most provocative issues
looming before American courts." Id.
19. The controversy over same-sex marriage began when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled
that Hawaii's marriage law discriminated on the basis of sex under the Hawaii Constitution by not
allowing same-sex couples to marry. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,48 (Haw. 1993). The court
remanded the case to determine whether the state could meet its burden of showing a compelling
interest for refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry. See id. at 68. The state lost on remand. See
Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir, Ct. Dee. 3, 1996). In
November 1998, ballot initiatives in Hawaii and Alaska overturned state court decisions legalizing
same-sex marriage in those states. See Vermont HearsSame-Sex MarriageArguments, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1998, at B4. In the meantime, the Vermont Supreme Court is expected to render
a decision concerning the right of same-sex couples to marry in the near future. See Lois R. Shea,
Same-Sex MarriageHopes Go North; Vermont's HighestCourtto Get Gay Couple'sCase,BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1998, at B1. Lawrence Tribe has stated that there is a good chance the same-sex
couple will win. See id.
20. See BarbaraJ. Cox, Same-Sex MarriageandChoice-of-Law: If We Marryin Hawaii,Are
We Still MarriedWhen We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033,1102-03; Deborah M. Henson,
Will Same-Sex MarriagesBe Recognized in SisterStates?: FullFaithandCredit andDue Process
Limitationson States' Choice ofLawRegardingthe StatusandIncidentsofHomosexualMarriages
Following Hawaii'sBaehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LouISVI.LE J. FAM.L. 551,599 (1993-94); Robert L.
Cordell, I1,
Note, Same-Sex Marriage:The FundamentalRight of Marriageand an Examination
of Conflict ofLaws and the FullFaith and CreditClause, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 247,26465 (1994); Note, In Sickness and in Health, in Hawaiiand Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and
RecognitionofSame-SexMarriages, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2038,2040-41 (1996); ThomasM. Keane,
Note,Aloha,Marriage?Constitutionaland ChoiceofLawArgumentsforRecognitionofSame-Sex
Marriages,47 STAN. L. REV. 499, 507-08 (1995).
21. See L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex
"Marriage":How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHToN L. REV. 29,
43-44 (1998); Raymond B. Marcin, Natural Law, Homosexual Conduct, and the Public Policy
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rejects both approaches on the ground that they are not substantively
neutral, and it argues that courts should determine choice of law for samesex marriages in a non-political manner.
One of the problems in the debate over same-sex marriage is that the
current choice of law rule for marriages is an atavistic remnant of an outmoded conception of choice of law. The usual choice of law rule for the
validity of a marriage is that a state will recognize a marriage if it is valid
at the place of celebration, unless the marriage conflicts with the forum's
public policy.22 This Article advocates that it be replaced by a new rule that
selects the law of the state with the closest connection to the validity of the
marriage-usually, the couple's domicile.' This author believes that this
rule respects state sovereignty as set out in the Constitution, while still
being fair to individuals.
Part I of this Article will examine suggested solutions to conflicts of
law and same-sex marriage. It will begin with the proposals of advocates
of same-sex marriage who want to employ choice of law to extend samesex marriage to states that do not have it as a matter of substantive law. It
will continue with the views of those who oppose using choice of law to
force same-sex marriage on a state in which same-sex marriage is against
public policy. It will also discuss recent statutes enacted to counter the
possibility that some state might legalize same-sex marriage, including
state statutes and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).24 Part II will
examine the traditional choice of law rule for the validity of marriages, and
it will argue that both the traditional rule and the public policy exception
should be abandoned. Part HI will present a new approach to choice of law
for the validity of marriages, based on a choice of law method this author
has previously developed. Finally, Part IV will discuss whether a state has
to bestow the normal incidents of marriage on a same-sex marriage
celebrated in another state under choice of law principles or the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.2 s

Exception, 32 CREIGHTONL. REV. 67,67-69 (1998); Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage"and
the Public Policy Doctrine,32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 65 (1998); see also Joseph W. Hovermill,
A Conflictof Laws andMorals:The Choice of Law ImplicationsofHawaii'sRecognition ofSameSex Marriages,53 MD. L. REV. 450,453-54 (1994) (concluding "that a court should not refuse to
recognize a homosexual marriage performed legally in another state unless the state legislature has
clearly stated a public policy to the contrary").
22. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OFLAWS § 13.5 (2d. ed. 1992).
23. See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.

24. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c).
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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I. CHOICE OF LAW AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
A POLmcAL DEBATE

A. Using Choice of Law to Extend Same-Sex
Marriageto Other States
Advocates of same-sex marriage have proposed using choice of law to
extend same-sex marriage to states that have not legalized such
marriages.26 These advocates believe that "the right to marry will
drastically impact the lesbian and gay civil rights movement."'27 Moreover,
"[t]he equal dignity afforded to homosexual relationships if marriage were
an option probably would go further to eradicate the deep-seated prejudice
against homosexuals and their families than any other type of legal
reform."28 In addition, some believe that legalizing same-sex marriage
"would disrupt the traditional gendered definition of marriage as a power
hierarchy for homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, thereby producing a
widespread socio-cultural impact stretching beyond merely the lesbian and
gay population and providing a model of egalitarian, intimate
relationships."29
Barbara Cox discusses various choice of law methods and finds
"significant general support for validation of our couple's same-sex
marriage... under each approach."3 However, she views better law
approaches-approaches that supposedly select the more just rule-as
particularly promising.3 ' While only a few states have adopted this method,
she declares that "it could be beneficial for advocates to argue that, when
considering the policy considerations or governmental interests behind
various statutes or public policies [with other conflicts approaches], courts
should conclude that recognizing same-sex marriage is the better public
policy."32 In other words, she believes that all the modem methods "leave
the judge in a position to reach the result that they believe is best."33
Accordingly, the key for Cox is to show why the state's law that
validates same-sex marriages is the best law.' Professor Cox, "recognizing
that results are important," argues

26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

27. Cox, supra note 20, at 1038.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Henson, supra note 20, at 557.
Id.
Cox, supra note 20, at 1097.
See id. at 1099-1117.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1100.
See id. at 1101.
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for applying the various choice-of-law theories in a better
manner to resolve these disputes. In these cases, the better
result would be to recognize the same-sex marriage. Such a
result is better because it eliminates age-old discrimination
based on prejudice and misunderstanding, and because it
eliminates overzealous state interference with and
condemnation of a most personal and intimate relationship.
Thus, same-sex
marriage should not violate forum public
35
policy.
A related argument for recognizing the validity of same-sex marriages
in other states is that choice of law should reflect an emerging policy over
a regressive one and that it should avoid anachronistic or aberrational
rules.36 Professor Cox asserts "that if the argument were presented by
proponents urging validation of same-sex marriage, courts might be
inclined to recognize [the law of a state that authorizes same-sex marriage]
and validate the marriage, because that law is more enlightened and
progressive." 37 She points out that
[s]ame-sex couples are the only adults, other than those who
violate some additional statutory proscription, who are not
freely permitted to marry the partner of their choice.
Restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples can also be seen
as merely continuing "the vestige
of a creed outworn" or "a
'
remnant of early common law." 8
Most importantly, she believes the trend is toward recognizing same-sex
relationships, "as seen from the passage of consenting adults statutes,
repeal of sodomy statutes, and provision of domestic partner benefits. 39
Professor Cox also compares the restrictions on same-sex marriage to
miscegenation statutes.' She declares that "[s]odomy and miscegenation
statutes violate the equal protection clause for the same reason: Beyond the
immediate harm they inflict upon their victims, theii purpose is to support
a regime of caste that locks some people into inferior social positions at
birth.'
While Professor Cox has presented some persuasive normative
arguments for changing state substantive law on same-sex marriage, her
35. Id.
36. See id. at 1104-05.
37. Id. at 1110.
38. IcL at 1109.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 1110-16.
41. Id. at 1112 (quoting Andrew Koppelman, Note, The MiscegenationAnalogy: Sodomy
Law as Sex Discrimination,98 YALE L.J. 145, 147 (1988)).
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contentions do not support using choice of law for that end. First, she
advocates employing choice of law to skirt state substantive law. As will
be shown in more detail below, choice of law should not be used to force
a state to adopt the values of another state in regulating the relationships
of its domiciliaries in its territory; such an outcome misconstrues the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Second,
Professor Cox misunderstands the judicial role in our legal system. It is not
a judge's role to change the law when the judge disagrees with the
legislature (assuming the law is constitutional) because such a choice
infringes upon the separation of powers. As Justice Kennedy has declared,
"The Framers of our Government knew that the most precious of liberties
could remain secure only if they created
a structure of Government based
42
on a permanent separation of powers."
Professor Cox also misconstrues how the better rule approach works in
practice. Generally, when a court uses the better rule approach, it adopts
forum law.43 While, as Professor Cox points out, there are notable
exceptions, such exceptions tend to concern non-controversial subjects and
archaic laws, such as guest statutes and survival statutes.44 More
importantly, there is no reason to assume that a judge will fimd the law of
a state that authorizes same-sex marriage to be the better rule when only
a small minority of states have such a rule. While many states are moving
toward greater recognition of gay and lesbian rights, this trend has not yet
encompassed the legalization of same-sex marriages.4' In other words,
while an argument can be made that a rule is more progressive, this does
not mean that a judge will adopt it in a choice of law setting, particularly
if there is a strong sentiment in the forum against it. Similarly, while it can
be argued that a rule is outdated or archaic, it is doubtful that a court will
accept this argument as long as only a handful of states have rejected the
supposedly archaic rule.
One problem with proposals like Professor Cox's is that they are
mainly normative. She raises some persuasive arguments concerning
choice of law and same-sex marriage, but, if one disagrees with the
normative aspects of her thesis, there is little left of her proposal. Deborah
Henson avoids this problem by arguing that the Full Faith and Credit
42. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,468 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
43. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 29-30.
44. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Ark. 1987);
Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Minn. 1981).
45. Professor Duncan has observed that since Baehr, a "national conversation has resulted
in a reaffirmation by acclamation of the traditional concept of marriage as a unique two person
community 'defined by sexual complementarity."' Richard F. Duncan, "They Call Me 'Eight
Eyes"': Hardwick's Respectability,Romer'sNarrowness,andSame-SexMarriage,32 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 241,248 (1998).
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Clause, like the Due Process Clause,4 6 mandates the recognition of samesex marriage. 47
Henson asserts that states could be required to recognize same-sex
marriage under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the same way that they
are required to recognize out-of-state divorces and adoption and
legitimation decrees.48 While a marriage is not a judgment like a divorce,
a marriage might be a record, which is also covered by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.49 She declares that
no one would quibble with the assertion that marriage,
regulated by state statutes, confers many private rights and
benefits upon those who enter its sanctified doors. Therefore,
the act of marriage and subsequent civil effects that flow from
the act should be subject to full faith and credit protection in
the same way as occurs inthe case of divorce.'0
As Henson admits, there is no law supporting her suggestion that
marriages are "records.""1 In fact, a marriage is not a record, but a "public
act,"5 2 that is, the marriage law of another state. More importantly, there is
no authority that says the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that a
marriage must be given the same full faith and credit as a judgment,
regardless of whether it is a record or an act. Divorces and adoption and
legitimation decrees are judgments that have been adjudicated by a court.
However, a marriage "is a purely administrative proceeding analogous to
the grant of a building permit or a corporate charter."5 3 Courts have
generally not required other states to give binding recognition under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to similar documents, such as a pharmacist's
license,5 4 a dentist's license, 5 or a law license.56 Similarly, when a state has
to recognize a foreign corporation, the recognition is required by the

46. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
47. See Henson, supra note 20, at 554-55.
48. See id.at 589.
49. Id. at 586-87. The text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause appears infra note 85 and
accompanying text.
50. Henson, supra note 20, at 587.
51. See id.at586-87.
52. See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implicationsfor Interjurisdictional
Recognition of Non-TraditionalMarriages,32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 153 (1998). In addition,
one cannot argue that a marriage is a judgment because there is no judicial action and no
controversy being litigated. See id. at 164-67.
53. David P. Currie, Full Faith& Credit to Marriages,1 GREEN BAG 7, 10 (1997).
54. See Louisiana Bd. of Pharmacy v. Smith, 76 So. 2d 722, 726 (La. 1954).
55. See State v. Rosenkrans, 75 A. 491, 500 (R.I. 1910), aft'd, 225 U.S. 698, 698 (1912).
56. See Kirkpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100,102 (11 th Cir. 1995); In re Tocci, 600 N.E.2d 577,
582 (Mass. 1992).
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commerce clause57 (which does not apply to marriages), not the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.5 8 Thus, it is hard to argue that a marriage must be given
the same status as a court adjudication.
This author is troubled by the suggestion that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, which is intended to protect state sovereignty, might be used to
force another state's values on a state that is more interested in a marriage.
This would happen if parties could go outside their domicile for a few
hours to get married, then return to their home proclaiming that their
domicile must acknowledge a marriage which, in the parties' domicile,
would be illegal. The Full Faith and Credit Clause was intended to protect
a state's sovereignty when it is the most interested state, not when it has
only a tenuous connection to the circumstances, 9 and courts should respect
this constitutional line. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court asserted
in Gore that a state cannot impose its policies on its neighbors; a state is
limited by "the need to respect the interests of other States."'
Henson also contends that states must recognize the validity of samesex marriages celebrated in other states under the due process clause.61 She
argues that
enacting legislation or deciding cases based on majoritarian
morality is specious at best. First, the prevailing moral code
changes with the times, as the recent national divorce reform
from fault-based to no-fault divorce illustrates. Second,
majoritarian morality is simply an inequitable and illogical
basis on which to support lawmaking that pertains to such an
important and personal institution as marriage.62
Henson tries to distinguish Bowers v. Hardwick,63 which held that there is
no due process right to homosexual conduct," on the ground that "being
homosexual is not merely a matter of performing certain sexual
activities. ,"65 She asserts that "while perhaps not protecting certain
homosexual conduct, [the Due Process Clause] does protect lesbians' and
57. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8.
58. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20,29-34 (1974); SCOLES & HAY, supra
note 22, at 921-22; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 cmt. b (1971)
[hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT].

59. As Professor David Currie has pointed out, the Clause's purpose "is to make it easier for
a state to regulate its own affairs, not to enable it to fiddle with the affairs of others." Currie, supra
note 53, at 11-12.
60. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1597 (1996).
61. See Henson, supra note 20, at 591-98.
62. Id. at 595.
63. 471 U.S. 186 (1986).
64. See id. at 189-91.

65. Henson, supra note 20, at 595.
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gay men's liberty and property rights." 66 She concludes that
[s]tatutes that deny homosexuals the right to marry and
decisions upholding these statutes, implicate due process
challenges precisely because they deprive a distinct minority
group from access to rights and benefits reserved exclusively
to married couples. . . . Depriving homosexuals of the
freedom to organize their own families and the freedom to
enjoy the rights and benefits which make a family more stable
and secure, is a liberty infringement. Depriving them
specifically of the attendant economic rights constitutes state
interference with lesbian and gay couples' constitutionally
protected property rights in violation of the Due Process
Clause.67
Henson's due process argument is problematic because it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will hold that the failure of a couple's domicile to
recognize the validity of a same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere violates
due process when that state can criminalize homosexual conduct under
Bowers. Choice of law simply is not a promising device to circumvent
Bowers. While Henson may be right that due process is broader than
Bowers, the Supreme Court has not interpreted liberty infringement and
protection of property rights in the manner she advocates. Similarly, her
argument that a legislature should not make law based on majority morality
is misguided.6" Majority rule is the essence of democracy, and a legislature
can make any law it wants as long as it does so within constitutional
bounds. Accordingly, unless the Supreme Court overrules Bowers, the Due
Process Clause does not prevent a couple's domicile from refusing to
recognize the validity of a same-sex marriage celebrated in another state.
In sum, this author mainly disagrees with arguments by advocates of
same-sex marriage on the grounds that choice of law should not be used
for substantive change and that one state should not be able to force its
value system on another more interested state through choice of law.69 In
other words, these proposals are ignoring the structural lines of horizontal
federalism embedded in the Constitution.

66. Id. at 597.
67. Id. at 597-98.
68. However, whether it should on normative grounds is another question. See generally
Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL L. REV. 479 (1989) (considering whether criminal
law should be used to enforce conventional ethics).
69. Professor Hogue has asserted that proponents ofsame-sex marriage have "radically tilted
the deliberative playing field of scholarship." Hogue, supra note 21, at 36 (citing Wardle, supra
note 18, at 18).
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B. Opponents of Using Choice of Law to Extend
Same-Sex Marriageto Other States
Several scholars have argued that states can use the public policy
exception to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated in other
states.70 This author disagrees with those scholars on the same ground that
he disagreed with advocates of same-sex marriage-that choice of law
should not be used to obtain substantive results and that choice of law
should respect the horizontal federalism lines in the Constitution.
Professor Hogue, one of the opponents of requiring states to recognize
same-sex marriage, writes:
What remains clear is that the longstanding practice of states
in refusing recognition to unions it finds unacceptable is both
salutary and constitutional. It protects the interests of the
forum in maintaining the integrity of a fundamental element
of civil society-the traditional marriage between a man and
a woman-and upholds a major tenant of federalism by
preserving the field of domestic relations both appropriately
and historically for states. 1
Professor Hogue continues:
Although some may dismiss such a line of analysis under the
epithet of so-called "homophobia," I persist in believing that
a well-grounded distaste for particular conduct that is viewed
as morally objectionable by a majority within a democratic
society-and hence proscribable under the police power in the
same way that other socially undesired conduct such as drug
use or prostitution is banable-is not a product of unreasoned
fear, as the term suggests but rather of proper moral
reservation. 72
Professor Marcin takes the above argument a step further and contends
that a state can refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage on natural law
grounds, like those found in the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas." He
asserts that "[w]ith our current widespread societal acceptance of the
premise that God is irrelevant to public moral thinking, we find ourselves
wallowing in a sea of moral relativism."'74
While this author agrees that a state has the authority to regulate public

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See supra note 21.
Hogue, supra note 21, at 35.
Id. at 36.
See Marcin, supra note 21, at 68.
Id. at 80.
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morality (within constitutional bounds), I do not think that choice of law
is the proper mechanism for doing so. In addition, as I will demonstrate in
the next Part, I believe that the public policy exception is
unconstitutional.75
Not satisfied with using the public policy exception to avoid
recognizing same-sex marriages, approximately thirty states have passed
statutes in reaction to the possibility that at least one state will legalize
same-sex marriage.76 These statutes "clearly state that only marriages
between a man and a woman may be validly performed in-state." More
importantly, most of the statutes declare that the state will not acknowledge
foreign marriages between same-sex couples. 78 A few of the statutes also
specifically refuse to give the incidents of marriage to such unions.79 For
example, after defining a marriage as "a civil contract between a man and
a woman," 80 Minnesota's statute states:
(a)

The following marriages are prohibited:
(4)

(b)

a marriage between persons of the same sex.
A marriage entered into by persons of the same sex,
either under common law or statute, that is recognized
by another state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this
state and contractual rights granted by virtue of the
marriage
or its termination are unenforceable in this
8
state. '

While this author questions whether states should pass such statutes,
the states undoubtedly have the power to do so under the United States
Constitution, especially considering Bowers. 2 The key question for this
Article, then, is when do these statutes apply under choice of law
principles? I will deal with this question in Parts LI and IV below.

75. See infra notes 147-76 and accompanying text.
76. See generally David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Definition or
Discrimination?State MarriageRecognition Statutes in the "Same-Sex Marriage" Debate, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 9-13 (1998) (explaining that 15 of the 30 state statutes invoke the words
"public policy").
77. Id. at 11.
78. See id. at 12.
79. See id.
80. MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (Supp. 1999).
81. MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (Supp. 1999).
82. I will discuss the constitutionality of a state's treatment of same-sex marriage in greater
depth in connection with the incidents of marriage in Part IV. See infra notes 262-93 and
accompanying text. Whether any of these statutes are unconstitutional on state constitutional
grounds is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Afraid that state statutes refusing to recognize same-sex marriages were
not enough to prevent states from being forced to acknowledge such
marriages, opponents of same-sex marriage lobbied Congress to pass a
statute preventing such an outcome. Congress passed such a statute in 1996
by enacting DOMA:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons
of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or
claim arising from such relationship. 3
If this statute is constitutional, it would allow states to refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages celebrated in other states and to decline to bestow the
incidents of marriage on such marriages under any circumstances. This
author, however, believes that DOMA is unconstitutional because
Congress lacked the authority to pass the Act under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause." The Full Faith and Credit Clause states:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,

83. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c).
84. Numerous other scholars concur. See 142 CONG. REC. S5931-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996)
(letter from Professors Laurence H. Tribe & Ralph S. Tyler, Jr.); Paige E. Chabora, Congress'
Power Underthe FullFaithand CreditClause andthe Defense ofMarriageAct of 1996,76 NEB.
L. REV. 604, 649 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage,Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921,974 (1998); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutionaland
Legal Defects in the "Defense of Marriage"Act, 16 QuINNIPIAc L. REV. 221, 222-26 (1996); see
also Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces of Federalism, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 457, 457
(1998) (stating that DOMA undermines the unity of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Melissa
Rothstein, Comment, The Defense of MarriageAct and Federalism:A States' Rights Argument in
Defense ofSame-SexMarriages,31 FAM. L.Q. 571,578-82 (1997) (discussing that limiting the Full
Faith and Credit Clause is inconsistent with the enactment history). But see Jeffrey L. Rensberger,
Same-Sex Marriagesand the Defense of MarriageAct: A Deviant View of an Experiment in Full
Faithand Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 409, 456 (1998) (concluding that DOMA is a valid
exercise of Congress's power under the Effects Clause); Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North
Carolina, DivorceRecognition, andSame-Sex MarriageRecognition,32 CREIGHTONL. REv. 187,
223 (1998) (stating that Congress had constitutional authority to enact DOMA); Ralph U. Whitten,
The OriginalUnderstandingof the FullFaithand CreditClauseandthe Defense of MarriageAct,
32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 225,391-92 (1998) (concluding that DOMA is constitutional based on a
historical understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
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813

5
and the Effect thereof8

The argument that Congress had the power to pass DOMA is based on
the second sentence, the so-called "Effects" Clause. 6 However, what those
who make this argument are ignoring is that the first sentence of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause uses the word "shall," which means that full faith
and credit is mandatory.87 Therefore, Congress cannot limit the scope of
the first sentence by using its authority under the Effects Clause.
This textualist reading of the first sentence is supported by its history.
Professor Kramer has observed that
Madison moved successfully to substitute "shall" for "ought"
in the Full Faith and Credit [Clause,] and "may" for "shall" in
the Effects Clause. It thus appears that a deliberate decision
was made to make the basic requirement of full faith and
credit mandatory and to give Congress discretionary power to
enforce it.88
Thomas v. Washington Gas &Light Co.89 also supports this conclusion:
[W]hile Congress clearly has the power to increase the
measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to the
laws or judgments of another State, there is at least some
question whether Congress may cut back on the measure of
faith and credit required by a decision of this Court.'
Similarly, it is unlikely that the Framers intended to give Congress the
power under the Effects Clause that it used in enacting DOMA. As
Professor Tribe has declared, to
claim that a law licensing States to give no effect at all to a
specific category of "Acts, Records and Proceedings" is a

85. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
86. See, e.g., Rensberger, supra note 84, at 456; Wardle, supra note 84, at 223; Whitten,
supra note 84, at 255.
87. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990) ("As used in statutes, contracts,
or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory."); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY 2085 (1971) ("[W]ill have to: must.").
88. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,Conflict of Laws, and the UnconstitutionalPublic
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 2004 (1997) (citing 2 THE RECORDS Op THE FEDERAL
CONVENTIONOF 1787, at488-89 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (James Madison, Sept. 3,1787));
see also Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional
Foundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLiM. L. REV. 249, 292 (1992).
89. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
90. Id. at 273-74 n.18.
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general law prescribing "the effect" of such acts, records and
proceedings.., is a play on words, not a legal argument....
The reason is straightforward: Power to specify how a sisterstate's official acts are to be "proved" and to prescribe "the
effect thereof" includes no power to decree that, if those acts
offend a Congressional majority, the[y] need to be given no
effect whatsoever by any state that happens to share
Congress's substantive views.91
In addition, the Supreme Court has recently been taking a narrower
view of Congress's authority to enact legislation, especially in the cases
cited by Judge Wilkinson.92 One commentator has compared Congress's
limited power under the Effects Clause with its limited power under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that "the
restrictions on Congress's power is the same under both clauses and that
the Effects Clause gives Congress no power to weaken the imperative of
full faith and credit."'9 3
This scholar's argument is especially relevant in light of the Court's
recent decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores(one of the cases cited by Judge
Wilkinson), which held that Congress lacked the power to enact the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9' Congress passed
RFRA in response to a Supreme Court case that had rejected a free
exercise claim brought by members of the Native American Church who
were denied unemployment benefits when they lost theirjobs because they
had used peyote, an illegal drug, during a religious service. 95 RFRA states
that
Free exercise of religion protected
(a)

Ingeneral

91. 142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996).
92. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2160 (1997); Printz v. United States, 117
S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (ruling that a portion of the Brady bill was unconstitutional); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (ruling that Congress did not have the power under the
commerce clauseto outlaw handgun possession near schools); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 149 (1992); see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 43 (1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d
820, 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
93. Chabora, supra note 84, at 635-39.
94. SeeBoerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
95. See id. at 2160 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
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Government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except as provided
in subsection (b) of this section.
(b)

Exception

Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person(1)

is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and

(2)

is the least restrictive means of furthering the
compelling governmental interest.'

In Boerne, a church wanted to enlarge its building. 7 The city council
had passed an ordinance authorizing its Historic Landmarks Commission
to prepare a preservation plan regarding proposed historic landmarks and
districts, and which required that the Commission pre-approve any changes
to historical landmarks or buildings in the district.98 When the church
applied for a building permit, city officials denied the permit under the
ordinance.' The church challenged the permit denial on various grounds,
1 °
including RFRA.
The Court held RFRA to be unconstitutional because Congress lacked
the power to enact it.10In passing RFRA, Congress had relied on Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."' 2 In considering the constitutionality of RFRA, Justice Kennedy
declared that "[u]nder our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of
enumerated powers."1 °3 He noted that "[legislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is."' 4 Justice Kennedy then added, "If Congress could define its

96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 (1994).
97. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at2160. RFRA is applicableto all levels of government. 42U.S.C.
§ 2000b-3(a).
98. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.

99. See id.
100. See id.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 2162-72.
Id. at 2162 (quoting U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 5).
Id.
Id.at 2164; see also Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1529 (1999) (stating "§ 5 grants

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 51

own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer
would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means.", 0 5 Consequently, "[s]hifting legislative minorities could
change the constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and
detailed amendment process contained in Article V."' °6
The principles from Boerne concerning RFRA also apply to DOMA.
In changing the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress altered
the meaning of the clause and changed what "full faith and credit"
means-that states can now give or deny full faith and credit based on
subjective preferences. Accordingly, Congress amended the Constitution
without following article V.
While this author believes that DOMA is unconstitutional, it will be
shown in Part III below that the Full Faith and Credit Clause will generally
not require a couple's domicile to recognize a same-sex marriage
celebrated in another state. However, other states will have to recognize
same-sex marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause when the
marriage was celebrated in the couple's domicile.'O°
II. CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT CHOICE OF LAW
RULE ON THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE AND

THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The current choice of law rule on the validity of marriages is a marriage
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted will everywhere be recognized unless it violates a strong public
policy of the forum. 8 Osoinachv. Watkins'09 presents a typical example
of this rule and the public policy exception. In Osoinach,an alleged widow
had petitioned an Alabama court for letters of administration for her
deceased husband's estate." 0 The deceased's relatives opposed the petition
on the ground that she was not the widow."' The couple, who were uncle
and niece, had gone from their Alabama domicile, which forbad such
12
persons to marry, to Georgia, which allowed such marriages, to wed.
After consummating the marriage, they returned to Alabama and lived as

Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees") (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641,651 n.10 (1996)).
105. Boeme, 117 S.Ct. at 2168.
106. Id.
107. I will deal with whether a state has to bestow the incidents of marriage on same-sex
unions celebrated in other states in Part IV.
108. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
109. 180 So. 577 (Ala. 1938).
110. Seeid.at578.
111. See id.
112. See id.
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husband and wife for many years.113
The court held the marriage void ab initio."4 The court declared that
[i]t is a general rule of law that a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. But this general rule, like
other rules of law, is not without its exceptions. Of course, a
marriage which is contrary to the law of nature as generally
recognized in Christian countries is void everywhere, and so
a marriage which the law-making power has declared void,
either in express terms or by necessary implication, shall not
be allowed any validity."'
An Alabama statute made marriages between uncle and niece
incestuous, and another statute made such marriages a crime." 6
Consequently, the marriage was void, and it conferred no property rights
upon the alleged widow." 7
While the public policy exception is an important part of the traditional
rule, it is usually employed only in cases where the public policy is very
strong, such as cases of incest or polygamy."' As Justice Cardozo declared
concerning the principle, courts "do not close their doors, unless help
would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal.""'9 For example, a domicile's courts generally uphold the validity of
a marriage when the parties are below the age of consent in the domicile
but of a legal age to marry in the state of celebration. 20 Similarly, although
it recognizes common law
New York does not have common law marriage,
2'
states.'
other
in
created
were
that
marriages
While the traditional choice of law rule is long-standing, it is time to
reevaluate its reasonableness. First, the rule originated in a period in which
the concept of choice of law was very different from that of today. Second,
the rule selects the law of ajurisdiction that may have a tenuous connection
to the marriage. Finally, the public policy exception, which is an integral
part of the rule, is unwise and is of dubious constitutionality.

113. See id.
114. See id. at 581.
115. Id. at 579 (citing Pennager v. State, 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889)).
116. Seeid.
117. See id.at 581.
118. See 2JOSEPH H. BEALS, ATREATISEONTHECONFuCTOFLAWS § 129.1, at 678 (1935);
SCOLES & HAY, supranote 22, at 438,444,450-51; SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 283,
cmts. j-k.
119. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198,202 (1918).
120. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 451-52.
121. See Ram v. Ramarack, 571 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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The traditional rule for the validity of a marriage became ensconced in
American law at a time of highly mechanical rules of choice of law, which
have largely been rejected today. Choice of law in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was based on a rigid territorialism: Justice Story had
written that "every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction within its own territory."' 22 Thus, it "would be wholly
incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of any
nation, that other nations should be at liberty to regulate either persons or
things within its territories."'2 3

Joseph Beale, the major proponent of the territorial approach to choice

of law, 4 thought a state had exclusive jurisdiction within its borders, but
no authority outside its boundaries."2 Thus, Beale believed the location of
a single, significant event within a jurisdiction, usually the last act,
determined which state's law would control.'26 For example, the law of the
place of the injury governed in tort cases, while the law of the place of the
making of the contract applied in contract cases. 27 Under this system,
rights and other obligations "vest" at the applicable time and place under
the governing state's law, and courts in other states must enforce the vested
right or obligation.'28
Beale's system contained mechanisms for the avoidance of the harsh
outcomes that might result from the rigid application of these territorial
rules. One such device was the public policy exception: despite the rule of
vesting mentioned above, a state did not have to employ another state's29law
if adopting that law was against a strong public policy of the forum.
The "conflicts revolution" has largely rejected Beale's mechanical rules
and the theoretical foundation of those rules. 130 Realist scholars in the

122.
123.
124.
125.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHE CONFUCT'OFLAWS § 18, at 19 (1st ed. 1834).
Id. §20, at 21.
See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 13-14.
See 1 BEALE, supra note 118, § 1.6, at 6; see also id., § 4.12, at 46.

126. See RESTATEMENT OFTHE LAW OFCONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) [hereinafter FIRST

RESTATEMENT]. Joseph Beale was the principle author of the FIRST RESTATEMENT.
127. See id. §§ 332,377.
128. See 2 BEALE, supra note 118, § 384.1, at 1298; 3 BEALE, supra note 118, § 73, at 196769. "'A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should
follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called in question anywhere."' 3
BEALE, supra, at 1969 (quoting 3 BEALE, SUMMARY OF THE CONFLcT OFLAWS §§ 1-5 (1902)).
Beale derived his notion of vested rights from the English theorist A.V. Dicey. Cf. SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 73; A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH
REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 22 (1896); see also J.H. Beale, Jr., Dicey's "Conflict of
Laws," 10 HARV. L. REV. 168 (1896-97) (discussing recognition of rights among territories).
129. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 126, § 612.
130. For a history of the conflicts revolution, see Scott Fruehwald, A MultilateralistMethod
of Choice of Law, 85 KY. L.J. 347,352-65 (1996-97). See also FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF
LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 88-150 (1993).
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1920s and 30s criticized Beale's approach on the grounds 1) that it did
reflect the law in practice;... 2) that the rules were mechanical; 1 2 3) that
courts select law based on policy, not territory;13 3 and 4) that it was
nonsensical to create a right that must be enforced by other jurisdictions,
then permit a state to refuse to recognize that right based on public
policy." Beginning in the 1950s and 60s, courts began to move away from
Beale's territorial method in favor of approaches that looked to see which
jurisdiction was the "center of gravity" or had the "most significant
relationship" to the case; 35 that determined whether the forum had an
interest in applying its law; 136 or that decided which state's law was the
"better" rule. 37 Today, almost all scholars have rejected Beale's approach
to choice of law. In addition, only fifteen states retain some version of
Beale's system, and those states38that use his rules have renounced the
vested rights part of his method.1
The conflicts revolution, however, bypassed choice of law rules on
marriage. The rule in use today is basically the same one employed by
Justice Story and Joseph Beale. Beale's rule on the validity of marriage,
like his other rules, was based on territory. It adopted the law of the place
of the last act, the place of celebration of the marriage. 39 Beale considered
a marriage to be like a contract,"4° and the law governing a contract was
that of the place of the making of the contract.14 ' As with any of his rules,
governing marriages was subject to the public policy
Beale's rule
142
exception.

As was true of Beale's rules on torts and contracts, there is little reason
to retain his rule on the validity of marriage. The place of the last act-the
place of the celebration of the marriage if it is different from the couple's

131. See Walter W. Cook, The Logical andLegal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
457,459-60 (1924).
132. See id.; David F. Cavers, A Critiqueof the Choice-of-Law Problem,47 HARV. L. REV.

173, 208 (1933).
133. See, e.g., Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality,PublicPolicy and the Conflict of Laws, 33

YALE .J. 736,743-45,748-50 (1924).
134. See id. at 746-47.
135. E.g., Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954).
136. See, e.g., Huratado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 669 (Cal. 1974); Reich v. Purcell,
432 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Cal. 1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963).
137. See, e.g., Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664,672 (Wis. 1967); Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d
205,209 (N.H. 1966).
138. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth
Annual Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447,459-60 (1997).
139. See 2 BEALE, supra note 118, § 121.2, at 669; see also FIRST RESTATEMENT, supranote
126, § 134, at 201.
140. See 2 BEALE, supra note 118, § 121.2, at 668-69.
141. See id., § 311.1, at 1044-46.
142. See id., § 129.1, at 678.
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domicile-is usually not the most significant connection to a marriage. In
most instances, the parties' domicile will be the most important
connection. The parties' domicile has a strong interest in regulating their
domiciliary's marriages, while the state of celebration has little interest in
the parties once they return home. One of the lessons of the choice of law
revolution is that courts should consider state interests in deciding choice
of law. 43 The traditional rule ignores the state with the strongest interest
in the marriage in favor of a state that has a much weaker connection to it.
Similarly, one of the reasons for the rejection of the place of the last act
rule for torts and contracts was that the place of the last act might be
fortuitous. " Say, for example, a Florida couple is driving to Maine. While
in Rhode Island, a state in which the couple has never been before, the wife
is injured due to her husband's negligence. Florida, allows torts suits
between spouses, but Rhode Island has spousal immunity.145 Because the
last act occurred in Rhode Island, Rhode Island's rule would apply, even
though the place of the accident was fortuitous and the couple had no
connection with Rhode Island.
Similarly, a person from New York and a person from Alabama
negotiate a contract in Alabama. The Alabaman makes an offer in
Alabama, but the New Yorker is unsure whether she wants to accept.
While driving through Georgia, she calls the Alabaman on her cell phone
to accept the offer. Under Beale's approach, because the last act-the
acceptance-was made in Georgia, Georgia law governs the contract,
despite the fact that Georgia has no real connection to the contract.
The current rule for the validity of marriages produces similar results.
A couple from Virginia, who have never been to Kentucky before, goes to
Kentucky because they are too young to marry in Virginia. Under the place
of celebration rule, their marriage would be valid, regardless of the fact
that they have no significant connection with Kentucky.
While it is true that the parties went to Kentucky voluntarily, this
should not change the result. It is a rule of conflicts that, when a contract
is made in another place so as to evade the law of the state of performance,
courts will not uphold the validity of the contract." Should a "marriage
contract" be treated differently?

143. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFICT OF LAWS 182-83 (1963).
144. See id. at 87-88, 132-34, 138-39, 180-81.
145. The hypotheticals in this paper do not necessarily reflect current state law.
146. See Young v. Mobil Oil Corp., 735 P.2d 654, 656-57 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (stating: "If
parties to a contract could circumvent the workers compensation laws by choosing the law of
another jurisdiction to govern their agreement, the statutory scheme would break down, thereby
causing injury to the public welfare."); SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 187, 202(2)
("When performance is illegal in the place of performance, the contract will usually be denied
enforcement."); see also id.; 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 92 (1998).
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In sum, the choice of law rule for the validity of marriages that upholds
marriages when they are valid in the place of celebration is a vestige of an
antiquated choice of law system that has been generally abandoned in other
areas. Moreover, it ignores the interest of the state that usually has the most
interest in applying its law-the couple's domicile. Finally, the traditional
rule produces fortuitous results in many cases.
The exception to the traditional rule-that a state may refuse to enforce
another state's law when that state's law is inimical to a strong public
policy of the forum-is also problematic for both practical and
constitutional reasons.147 As mentioned previously, realist scholars
criticized Beale's approach to choice of law because it created a rule that
states must follow, then allowed states to ignore that rule based on public
policy."1 Professor Lorenzen declared, "The doctrine of public policy in
the Conflict of Laws ought to have been a warning that there was
something the matter with the reasoning upon which the rules to which it
was an exception were supposed to be based." 4 9 The same reasoning
applies to the traditional marriage rule and the public policy exception. It
seems absurd to have a rule that requires a forum court to follow the law
of the state of celebration, except when the law of that state is against the
state's public policy. Instead of following Beale's convoluted approach,
would it not be easier and more reasonable to change the choice of law rule
5
to one that adopts the domicile's marriage law?5'
The public policy exception also gives judges too much discretion,
unless they are acting under a clear statutory mandate. There is a clear
danger that, when a judge finds another state's law violates the forum's
public policy, she is using her own values to make the decision. 5 ' In
addition, the outcome may depend on which judge a litigant draws; a
different judge may apply different values.
More important is the fact that the public policy exception contravenes
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the most important clause regulating the
relationship of the states. 5 2 When a court employs the traditional rule, it
is stating that it believes that the other state's law governs, but that it will

147. The public policy exception originated in customary international law, and all states have
adopted it without considering its validity in a federal union subject to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and other constitutional provisions. See Kramer, supranote 88, at 1971-72; Laycock, supra
note 88, at 313.
148. See Lorenzen, supra note 133, at 746-47.
149. Id. at 747.
150. I will develop this idea in greater depth below in connection with the public policy
exception and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See infranotes 160-70 and accompanying text.
151. This is especially true when a controversial issue like same-sex marriage is involved.
152. Other scholars have argued that the public policy exception violates the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. See Kramer, supra note 88, at 1966-67; Laycock, supra note 88, at 313. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause is set out in full above. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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not adopt that law because it is against the forum's public policy. This
failure to use the other state's law when it should apply it according to its
own mandate violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Independent
nations do not have to give any credit to a foreign nation's laws, and when
they do so they are using "comity... the principle that courts of one state
or jurisdiction will give effect to laws ana judicial decisions of another
state out of deference and mutual respect rather than out of duty."15
However, the Full Faith and Credit Clause "substituted a command for the
earlier principles of comity" for American states, and it compels them to
give full faith and credit to the statutes and case law of other states.'54
To permit a state to ignore the law of a sister state based on public
policy renders the Full Faith and Credit Clause meaningless. Professor
Kramer has declared that "[i]t is difficult to think of a justification more at
' Similarly, Douglas
odds with the principal mission of the Clause."155
Laycock thinks the Full Faith and Credit Clause places strong limitations
on a state's power to reject another state's law:
A state does not owe some credit, partial credit, or credit
where it would be wholly unreasonable to deny credit, which
seems to be the Supreme Court's current interpretation.
Rather, each state owesfull faith and credit to the law of sister
states. Full faith and credit is what a state accords its own
law.... Thus, the Clause is most plausibly read as requiring
each state to give the law of every other state the same faith
and credit it gives its own law-to treat the law of sister states
as equal in authority to its own.'56
Some scholars have argued that the public policy exception does not
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause because a state has a legitimate
interest in applying its law. For example, Professor Myers has written that
"[t]he home state is invoking its public policy to apply its own law in a
situation where the forum has important connections to the parties and the
'marriage. ' "' 157 Similarly, Professor Hogue has declared that
[p]ublic policy is so integral apart of the decision of a state as
to who can be married, to whom and under what
circumstances, that no state can dictate the terms of that
relationship for another. Only overarching national goals,

153.
154.
U.S. 541,
155.
156.
157.

Smith v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 24,27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663 (1998) (citing Estin v. Estin, 334
546 (1948)).
Kramer, supra note 88, at 1986.
Laycock, supra note 88, at 296 (footnote omitted).
Myers, supra note 21, at 52.
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such as constitutionally compelled color-blindness in the
treatment of individuals by the government, can override a
state's ordering of these relationships. 5 '
Professor Hogue also has asserted that the public policy exception is
constitutionally protected: "The public policy exception, which protects
states against the application of foreign laws that are repugnant to the
principles upon which the forum state is grounded, is rooted in'principles
of federalism 15
and
the protection of sovereignty which inheres in the Tenth
9
Amendment."
The main problem with the argument that a state can employ the public
policy exception when it has a legitimate state interest is that its choice of
law rules establish that the other state's law is the proper law. In essence,
the state is saying that we should be applying the other state's law, but we
are not going to because we disagree with the law's content. This the Full
Faith and Credit Clause forbids. 16W
On the other hand, if a state changed its choice of law rule to adopt the
rule of the state with the closest connection to the controversy, there would
be no problem. 161 Then, the state could apply its rule when it was most
closely connected to the controversy-when it truly had a legitimate
interest in employing its law. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
forbid a state from adopting its law when it is the state most closely
connected to the facts. 62
Alexander v. General Motors63 illustrates the advantages of using
choice of law directly to further a state's interest, rather than employing the
public policy exception to do so indirectly to retain an antiquated choice
of law rule. 1"' In Alexander, a Georgia resident, who was injured while
driving in Virginia, brought a products liability action in Georgia against
the car's manufacturer based on strict liability. 16 The trial court had

158. Hogue, supra note 21, at 37 (footnotes omitted).
159. Id. (footnote omitted).
160. Professor Kramer has asserted that "[t]he argument, in a nutshell, is that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause prohibits states from selectively discriminating in choice of law based on
judgments about the desirability or obnoxiousness of other states' policies." Kramer, supra note
88, at 1966-67. Consequently, "whatever choice-of-law rule or approach a state adopts, it cannot
alter its willingness to apply foreign law based solely on the substantive policy of the other state."
Id. at 1967.
161. Professor Kramer has pointed out that "we should distinguish between two kinds of laws:
those that promote a state's objectives by defining the parties' substantive rights in particular ways,
and those that promote a state's objectives by withholding from state courts the power to entertain
claims based on other states' laws." Id. at 1983.
162. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532,547 (1935).
163. 478 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. 1996).
164. See id.
165. See id.
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granted the manufacturer partial summary judgment because Georgia
adhered to Beale's approach to choice of law, and there was no strict
products liability action under Virginia law, the place of the accident. 1"
The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that Virginia's law did not
offend Georgia's public policy. 67
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, declaring that the court of
appeals missed "the crucial point that Georgia's public policy of shifting
to manufacturers the burden of loss caused by defective products is
effectuated by precisely those 'somewhat different methods.' 16 The Court
declared, "Virginia law and Georgia law are radically dissimilar in terms
of the burden placed on persons seeking recompense for injuries caused by
defective products. ' 69
The court would have been better off rejecting Beale's place of the
accident rule, rather than using the public policy to manipulate choice of
law. Georgia could have directly applied its strict liability rule to a case
involving a Georgia resident who bought an automobile in Georgia.
Instead, it created great uncertainty as to when it will use the public policy
exception; there is no moral dilemma in using a negligence rule, rather
than a strict liability rule, in a torts case. 170 Consequently, one must wonder
whether Georgia will employ the public policy exception whenever another
state's law is different from its own, thus, substituting forum-favoring
choice of law for the last act rule, without having formally changed its rule.
It appears the Supreme Court has recently upheld the constitutionality
of the public policy exception in dicta.' However, in Baker, the Court
relied on Nevada v. Hall,172 which did not involve the public policy
exception."' Rather, that case stood for the proposition that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require a state to ignore its statutes and give
effect to another state's statutes, as long as the state has a legitimate public
policy in applying its laws. 74 The Court in Hall declared that

166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 124.
169. Id.
170. Professor Kramer has noted that "[a]t least among states of the United States, very few
laws that are also constitutional can fairly be characterized as violating 'fundamental principles of
justice."' Kramer, supra note 88, at 1972-73. Thus, "[tihe measure of repugnance in this sense is
fixed by the federal Constitution, and states have no business selectively ignoring or refusing to
recognize the constitutional laws of sister states because they do not like them." Id. at 1987.
171. SeeBaker, 118S. Ct. at 664.
172. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
173. See id. at 422.
174. See id. at 421-24.
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the full faith and credit clause [sic] does not require one state
to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and
events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even
though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the
state of its enactment with respect to the same persons and
events. 175
In other words, the case involved a positive rule, rather than an exception.
In addition, one can argue that California had the closest connection to
the controversy in Hall. The case involved whether Nevada's sovereign
immunity applied in a case brought by a California resident against Nevada
when a Nevada-owned vehicle collided with the plaintiff's car on a
California highway. 176 California law should probably govern in a case
involving an accident occurring on California roads between a California
resident and a non-resident.
In sum, this author believes that the traditional rule for the validity of
marriages should be abandoned. In addition, the public policy exception in
choice of law should be unconstitutional despite dicta in Baker because it
interferes with the horizonal federalism lines of the Constitution.
III. A NEUTRAL SOLUTION TO CHOICE OF
LAW AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

A. Normative Criteriafor a Choice of
Law Rule for Same-Sex Marriage
The above has demonstrated the problems with the approaches of both
the advocates of same-sex marriage who want to use choice of law to bring
same-sex marriage to states that have not adopted it and the opponents of
same-sex marriage who want to use choice of law as a shield against samesex marriage. The problem common to both approaches is that they attempt
to use choice of law for substantive change in violation of the lines drawn
by the Constitution. As stated earlier, choice of law is not the proper
mechanism for substantive change; substantive change should be made in
substantive law.
This author advocates that courts should deal with choice of law
problems in same-sex marriage in the same manner that they deal with all
choice of law problems. The validity of same-sex marriages does not
require a different choice of law approach just because same-sex marriages
are controversial.

175. Id. at 422-23 (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493,502 (1939)).
176. See id. at 412.
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This author thinks that a choice of law method should meet the
following normative requirements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Choice of law should be grounded in positive law;
Choice of law should be substantively neutral;
Choice of law should be forum neutral;
Choice of law should be predictable;
Choice of law should be fair to individuals; and
Choice of
77 law should reflect the relevant states'
interests.

This author believes that these criteria balance the structural lines drawn
by the Constitution with the need to protect individual rights.
First, a court should not apply a state's law to a controversy when the
lawmaker did not intend the law to encompass that situation. For example,
a state would not have intended to extend its strict products liability rule
-to cases where the product is manufactured, bought, and used outside that
state, and involving no state domiciliaries. Similarly, a state would usually
not have meant its marriage validity laws to encompass a marriage
celebrated in another state involving foreigners.
Second, a choice of law rule for the validity of marriage should be
substantively neutral. As stated earlier, choice of law in general should be
content neutral. The role of choice of law is to select the law of the most
appropriate jurisdiction, not to decide which state's law is better. When
courts adopt the better rule they sometimes use the law of a jurisdiction
with a tenuous connection to the dispute. In addition, people cannot
conform their behavior to the law when the law to be used depends on
which judge they might draw.
The controversy concerning choice of law and the validity of same-sex
marriages illustrates the problems with using choice of law to attain
substantive goals. If the right to have a same-sex marriage recognized by
a court depends on the substance of that right, then whether that right is
valid will hinge on the judge's view of same-sex marriage. This is not a
decision for a judge to make on a case by case basis during the choice of
law process; rather, the state legislature should make that decision as a
matter of substantive policy.'
Third, the validity of a marriage should not differ depending on the
jurisdiction in which a party files suit or tries to get the marriage
recognized. A marriage should either be valid or invalid everywhere.

177. For more information on this author's normative approach to choice of law, see
Fruehwald, supra note 130, at 365-75.
178. Legislatures, not judges, should make policy determinations. See RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 242-44 (1986).
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Under the traditional rule that allows a public policy exception, one state
might recognize a marriage while another might not. Considering the
mobility of modem society, such a rule is unworkable.
Fourth, predictability is an important choice of law value. Persons
should be able to predict the applicable law so that they can comply with
it. Predictability is especially important in connection with marriage.
Persons need to know whether their marriage is valid to be able to plan
their lives, their living arrangements, their responsibilities to their partner,
their relationships to their children, the disposition of their property upon
their death, etc. A choice of law rule for marriage that depends on the
content of the rule or the forum in which the suit is filed is unpredictable.
Fifth, fairness to individuals is of paramount importance for choice of
law. A choice of law method should not impose the law of a state on a
person when the state has little or no connection to the dispute. This is not
a problem for parties to a same-sex marriage when a court enforces the law
of the state of celebration to recognize the validity of the marriage because
the parties voluntarily went to that state to be married.' 79 However, it might
be unfair to a person who might inherit from one of the same-sex partners.
Fairness to individuals is also implicated when a state refuses to
recognize a same-sex marriage based on the law of a jurisdiction with a
tenuous connection to the situation. A state should not be able to refuse to
recognize a right when that state has little connection with the controversy,
even if recognizing that right violates a strong state public policy.
Finally, state interests should be respected during the choice of law
process. Each state has its own values, and as long as those values do not
violate the Constitution, other states should respect them. A state's values
are not respected when one state tries to force its values on another state
through choice of law when the controversy is local to the state whose
values are being ignored. This would occur if choice of law rules force a
couple's domicile to acknowledge the validity of a same-sex marriage
when the couple's domicile does not allow such marriages. A couple's
domicile has a strong interest in regulating the marriages of its
domiciliaries, while the state of the celebration has little interest in
governing the marriages of couples who live in other states. Thus, a
couple's domicile should not be forced to adopt the values of a state with
only a tenuous connection to the marriage. As Representative Campbell
noted:
While California recognizes opposite-sex marriages from
Hawaii, the recognition of same-sex marriages is, for better or
worse, a more significant departure from California's existing
179. When a party wants to end a same-sex marriage, there is a possibility that that person will
argue that the marriage is invalid, rather than face the consequences of divorce.
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public policy. It should be adopted or not by vote of
California's Legislature or by the people directly through
not by the action of ajustice of the peace in another
initiative,
180
state.
Some scholars will disagree with the above on the ground that a state's
refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage is parochial and even biased.
However, states have the authority to select whatever values they want as
long as that choice does not violate the United States Constitution. "[T]he
states stand on an equal level or plane under our constitutional system,"''
and they "are equal to each other in power, dignity, and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution itself."' 82 Forcing one state's values on another
state through choice of law contravenes the structure of our federal system.
As one observer has noted, 'When the law applied is different from that of
the community where a substantial portion of the litigation-creating
occurrence took place, that community's consensus on the appropriate
legal consequences is frustrated."' 83
Similarly, allowing communities to have differing values is one reason
to have subdivisions of a national state. Professor Kreimer has written that
[o]ne of the virtues of a territorial federalism is precisely that
it allows conflicting communities of commitment to coexist
within a single national polity, while allowing individuals to
move fluidly among them. On issues of fundamental life
choices, America has often been a house divided, with the
individual citizens entitled to decide the rooms in which they
wish to live.' g"
This is true even when those values are controversial. As Justice Scalia

180. Tom Campbell, Perspectiveson Same-Sex Marriages,Los ANGELES TIMES, July 12,
1996, at B9.
181. Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. 455, 462 (1935) (citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419,465 (1922)).
182. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69,77 (1941).
183. James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry About Full Faithand Credit to Laws, 60 S.
CAL L. REV. 1299, 1336 (1987); see also Currie,supranote 53, at 8 (stating "the marital status of
Illinois citizens is none of Hawaii's business"); Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island ofHawaiiBind
the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and FederalismValues, 16 QulNNIPIAC L. REV.
191, 204 (1996) ("Domiciliaries and residents of other states are subject to the mores of their
communities, and the marriage blessing of authorities in Hawaii should not alter those community
norms.").
184. Seth F. Kreimer, TerritorialityandMoralDissensus:Thoughts onAbortion,Slavery, Gay
Marriageand Family Values, 16 QurNNIPIAC L. REV. 161,163 (1996).
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observed in his dissenting opinion to a Supreme Court decision that struck
down a Colorado constitutional amendment that forbad giving special
protections to gays or lesbians:
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The
constitutional amendment before us here is not . the
manifestation of a "'bare... desire to harm"' homosexuals,
but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores... through
use of the laws. That objective, and the means chosen to
achieve it, are not only unimpeachable under any
constitutional doctrine hitherto pronounced... ; they have
been specifically approved by the Congress of the United
States and by this Court....
Since the Constitution of the United States says nothing
about this subject, it is left to be resolved by normal
democratic means.... This Court has no business imposing
upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class
from which the Members of this institution are selected,
pronouncing that "animosity" toward homosexuality is evil."8 5
The above principles also apply to the opposite situation. If the state
with the closest connection to a marriage legalizes that marriage and the
marriage does not violate the Constitution, another state should not be able
to invalidate that marriage on the ground that the other state has a different
value system. Therefore, when the state of celebration and the couple's
domicile are the same, that state has the closest connection to the marriage.
Other states, therefore, must recognize that marriage and respect the
marriage state's sovereignty.
B. ConstitutionalCriteriafor a Choice
of Law Rule for Same-Sex Marriage
The above criteria are normative, and while they can provide guidance
to a court in forming a choice of law rule for same-sex marriage, they are
not binding on any court. However, this author believes that content and
forum neutrality are required by the United States Constitution. While the
current constitutional restraints on choice of law are minimal,186 several
scholars, including this Article's author, have argued that the Constitution
places greater constraints on choice of law than the Supreme Court

185. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620,1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
186. The current standard is that a "[s]tate must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
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currently recognizes. '7 These constraints appear mainly in the Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.18 8 The Due Process Clause protects
individual liberty, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause draws the
structural lines that govern the relationship of the states.
The Due Process Clause limits a state's authority over the individual
and protects individual liberty.189 This author believes that to implement
the Due Process Clause fully, a court should undertake a two step analysis
of a state's choice of law."g First, the court must determine whether a state
can extend its law to a controversy without violating due process. This
constraint is minimal; a significant contact to the controversy will
suffice.' 91 The second step is more rigorous: If another state's law might
also be applicable to the facts under the first step (meaning a true conflict
exists), then the court must decide whether adoption of the first state's rule
satisfies due process in light of the other law's claim to application. This
writer thinks that when a court employs a state's law when another state's
law has a significantly closer connection to the facts, it has violated due
process.
What justifies the above due process standard for choice of law? First,
this author believes that a person has a due process right not to have the
law of a state with a tenuous connection to that person's actions applied to
those actions when the law of a state with a significantly closer connection
could be employed. Is it fair that when a person conforms his conduct to
the law of the state that is most closely connected to a situation that a court
could adopt another state's law because that law is forum law or because
the judge subjectively thinks the other state's law is substantively more
just? Second, the current due process standard allows a person to be
subject to inconsistent laws, and it is a basic principle of our judicial

187. See Scott Fruehwald, ConstitutionalConstraintson State Choice ofLaw, 24 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 40,41 (1998); Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Choice of Law: The Priority
of Fairnessover Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651,654 (1987); Laycock, supra note 88, at 249; see
also Peter Hay, FullFaithand Creditand Federalismin Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L. REV. 709,
711 (1983); Pielemeier, supranote 183, at 1299; Gene R. Shreve, Choice ofLaw and the Forgiving
Constitution,71 IND. L.J. 271,271 (1996).
188. A few scholars have found constitutional constraints in the Constitution's
antidiscrimination clauses-Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Choice
of Law and the State's Interest in Protectingits Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 192-200
(1981); Laycock, supra note 88, at 249. However, this author thinks that use of these clauses is
unnecessary because of the constraints placed on state choice of law by the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Clauses.
189. See Fruehwald,ConstitutionalConstraints,supra note 187, at 56-63; Kogan, supra note
187, at 694 n.230.
190. See Fruehwald, ConstitutionalConstraints,supra note 187, at 60-61, 69-70.
191. This step is basically the same as current law. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313.
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system that a person not be subject to inconsistent laws.' 92 When a person
is subject to inconsistent laws, that person cannot conform his or her
conduct to the law because the person lacks notice of what constitutes
unlawful conduct, an unfair result that violates due process.193 Finally,
without stricter due process constraints on state choice of law, a person
could be exposed to unfair choice of law without political redress. The Due
Process Clause should protect a person from being unfairly subjected to a
state's law when that person is not a member of that community-when
that person lacks the right to vote or otherwise affect the political
process.19"
This author believes that "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause places
similar constraints on choice of law."195 As mentioned above, the court's
current interpretation of full faith and credit constraints on choice of law
is minimal. " However, this author questions why the Court has given such
a limited reading to constraints on state choice of law under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Courts should "refrain from being textually selective"
in constitutional interpretation.9 As Judge Wilkinson has pointed out,
"[h]ow one clause can be robust and the other anemic is a mystery when
both clauses, after all, are part of our Constitution." '9 8 Placing greater
structural limitations on the states is particularly important in light of the
new judicial activism, which gives states greater authority than

previously!

9

While a state should not have to adopt another state's law whenever
192. See LONL.FULLER,THEMORALTy OFLAW 39 (1964); Antonin Scalia, TheRule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989).
193. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996). Douglas Laycock has
averred that "[p]eople cannot obey the law unless they know it; they cannot know the law unless
they know which law to learn. If I am to know the law that governs an act or transaction, I must be
able to identify, before I act, the one state empowered to govern." Laycock, supra note 88, at 319.
194. Similarly, Terry Kogan has declared that
when a state seeks to apply its law to a person who has no affiliation with the state
that can justify application of that state's law .... an individual is asked to comply
with a state's law when the individual has no political obligation to do so. The
state is seeking to exercise sovereign power that it was not given by the
Constitution. Constitutional concerns for fairness constrain this fundamental
overstepping by a state.
Terry S. Kogan, supra note 187, at 699-700.
195. Fruehwald, supra note 187, at 72; see also Laycock, supra note 88, at 296.
196. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
197. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 894 (4th Cir. 1999).
198. Id. at 895.
199. This seems to be what the Court was doing in Saenz, where the Court breathed new life
into the largely dormant Privileges and Immunities Clause oftheFourteenth Amendment. See Saenz
v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1525-28 (1999).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 51

that other state's law has a colorable claim to application, the opposite is
also true: a state should not be able to ignore another state's law when the
other state has a stronger connection to a controversy. The Supreme Court
has recently declared that the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was to alter the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created
under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others,
and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout
which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as
of right, irrespective of the state of its origin.2"
The only way to fulfill this purpose is for a state to apply its law when it
has the closest connection to a controversy, and to yield its sovereignty and
adopt the law of another state when that other state has a significantly
closer connection to the situation. As Justice Jackson observed, "[a]nything
taken from a state by way of freedom to deny faith and credit to law of
others is thereby added to the state by way of a right to exact faith and
credit for its own."' '
The traditional choice of law rule for the validity of marriages violates
the above constitutional standard. When the laws of the state of the
celebration of a marriage and the state of the couple's domicile differ, the
couple's domicile will usually have a significantly closer connection to the
marriage because that is where the couple lives. Thus, use of the law of the
celebration state will violate both the Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Clauses. As stated above, it is unfair to an individual to have the law
of a state with a tenuous connection to an occurrence govern that
occurrence. Similarly, ignoring a state's sovereignty by refusing to apply
its laws when it has a significantly closer connection to the controversy
violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause, particularly when the state whose
laws are being ignored is the couple's domicile.
The public policy exception also violates this standard. It is unfair to
the individual that the law of the state with the closest connection to a
dispute does not govern that dispute solely because a court feels that
employing that law is against the public policy of a state with a tenuous
connection to the case. As stated above, the public policy exception also
violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It is an infringement upon state
sovereignty and, consequently, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, for a state
to use its law to further its parochial interests in a case that has a

200. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657,663 (1998); accord,Milwaukee County
v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935).
201. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith andCredit-TheLawyer's Clauseof the Constitution,45
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 33 (1945).
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significantly closer connection to another jurisdiction because the other
state's law clashes with the first state's public policy.
C. A Neutral Choice of Law Rule for the
Validity of Same-Sex Marriage
This author has developed a neutral method of choice of law that
satisfies both the normative and constitutional criteria set forth above. 2
Under this approach, a court should identify the legal relations created by
the states whose laws might govern the facts and, when two or more states
create legal relations that apply to the facts (a true conflict), choose the
state's law that has the closest connection to the controversy.
In the first step, a court should identify every legal relation that might
encompass the dispute. However, the court should not use just any state
law that might be relevant; the judge must establish each law's
scope-whether the lawmaker intended the law to cover the situation. The
judge must determine whether the law has only intrastate applicability or
whether the lawmaker intended the law to extend beyond the state's
borders, and, if so, under what circumstances.
In determining a law's scope, the judge should try to discern the
legislature's actual intent. If this is not possible (which will often be the
case), the judge should attempt to establish the legislature's constructive
intent by examining the law's purpose.
The second step-determining which state has the closest connection
to a dispute when two or more states' laws might govern-is both
quantitative and qualitative; it is a rigorous approach that requires a court
to analyze connections carefully. First, the court uses only those
connections that are relevant to the issue being decided. For example, the
fact that a North Dakota resident owns business property in California is
irrelevant in a lawsuit involving a traffic accident occurring in California
that is unrelated to the property's ownership. In addition, some connections
are more significant than others. For instance, the fact that a family is
domiciled in Oregon is a more important connection when the issue
concerns whether interspousal tort immunity applies than the fact that the
accident happened in Illinois.
Under the first step of this method, both the state of celebration and the
party's domicile could employ their laws to determine the validity of a
marriage. The state of celebration could apply its law because a state
intends its marriage laws to regulate marriages that take place within its
borders. Similarly, the party's domicile could adopt its law because it
intends its marriage laws to govern its domiciliaries' marriages. Thus,

202. See Fruehwald, supra note 130, at 375-401; Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal
Courts:A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 21, 49-57 (1998-99).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 2
834

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

when a marriage occurs outside the couple's domicile, both the marriage
state and the domiciliary state have meant that their laws govern the
validity of the marriage, so a true conflict exists, and the court must go on
to step two of the method.
Step two of the method would require a court to adopt the law of the
couple's domicile when determining the validity of a marriage in most
instances. When a couple lives in one state, but goes to another state to
marry, the domicile state has the closest connection to the controversy
because the domicile is where the parties will live, the domicile will
regulate the continuing status of the marriage, and the domicile will
provide or withhold the incidents of marriage.'1° Thus, when a couple
leaves their domicile to be married in a state that authorizes same-sex
marriage, then returns to their domicile which does not, their marriage is
invalid.
The above method, however, will require states to recognize the
validity of same-sex marriages in certain circumstances, such as when the
parties marry in their domicile and their domicile authorizes same-sex
marriages. As Professor Kramer has noted, "There is an obvious difference
between a couple that recently married outside a state to evade that state's
marriage restrictions and a couple that moved into the state after living
together for twenty years in a place that recognized their union."2 4 Not
recognizing such a marriage frustrates the parties' reasonable expectations
(that all states in a federal union will recognize a marriage of many years
that was legal in the couple's domicile when they married) and, thus,
violates the Due Process Clause. Moreover, a state refusing to
acknowledge a marriage under these circumstances had no interest in the
marriage at the time of celebration, and, accordingly, that state could not
adopt its law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Part IV of this Article
will explore the implications of this outcome for the incidents of marriage.
As mentioned above, this author's method of determining choice of law
for same-sex marriages satisfies the normative and constitutional criteria
discussed earlier. Adopting the law of the state with the closest connection
to the controversy will ensure that the choice of law rule for the validity of
a marriage is grounded in positive law. As stated above, both the state of
celebration and the couple's domicile can extend their laws to determine
the validity of a marriage. It is doubtful that any other state will be able to
apply its law to this issue because it is unlikely that another state has a

203. I will discuss the incidents of marriage in Part IV below. See infra notes 230-94 and
accompanying text.
204. Kramer, supra note 88, at 1970; see also Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On
SubsequentDomiciles'Refusing toRecognizeSame-SexMarriages,66 U.CIN.L.REv. 339,341-42

(1998).
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significant connection to the validity of a marriage other than the domicile
or celebration states.
Using the law of the state with the closest connection to a marriage to
establish the validity of that marriage is substantively and forum neutral.
This author's method does not consider the law's content (other than its
scope) in making the choice of law decision; rather, it selects law based on
significant connections in the same way it does with any other type of law.
Similarly, the outcome under this method does not depend on where the
case is filed because the method is forum neutral.
Because choice of law under this method is content and forum neutral,
it is predictable. Choice of law will not depend on an idiosyncratic judge's
view of which law is the best, nor will it hinge on the forum in which the
case is litigated. In fact, choice of law for the validity of marriages should
be particularly predictable because the couple's domicile will usually have
the closest connection to the marriage.
The method is also fair to individuals. Individuals usually expect that
the law with the closest connection to their conduct will regulate their
conduct. In the case of a marriage, it should not surprise a couple that their
domicile's law governs their marriage. While a couple may want to use
another state's law to validate their marriage, it is not unfair to expect
persons to live under their domicile's democratically-enacted laws
(assuming those laws are constitutional).
The above method respects the interests of the relevant states. The
couple's domicile has the most interest in regulating their domiciliaries'
marriages. While the state of celebration may have an interest in marriages
performed within its boundaries, its interest is not as strong as the state
where the couple intends to live. Finally, while other states may not want
to recognize the validity of same-sex marriages, their interests should yield
to the state that is more closely connected to the marriage-the domicile
or the celebration state. The interests of the other states will be respected
when they have the greatest interest in applying their laws-when they
have the closest connection to the dispute.
It is obvious that a choice of law method that adopts the law of the state
with the closest connection to the marriage will satisfy the proposed
constitutional requirement that a state not adopt the law of a state when
another's state's law has a significantly closer connection to the dispute.
Such a method also satisfies due process. As stated above, parties will not
be surprised when their domicile's law controls the validity of their
marriage, and it is not unfair for persons to be governed by their home
state's law. Similarly, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is satisfied because
the law of the state with the closest connection to the situation is adopted.
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D. Other PossibleSolutions to Choice of Law
and the Validity of Same-Sex Marriage
Professor Kramer has suggested that other modem conflicts systems
could be used in place of the traditional choice of law rule for the validity
of marriages.' 5 However, problems exist with the major modem methods
when applied to the validity of marriages. The four major choice of law
2°
methods that courts use today are 1)Beale's FirstRestatementapproach, 0
2) the Second Restatement approach, °7 3) Brainerd Currie's governmental
interest analysis method,20" and 4) the better rule approach. 2" The First
Restatement approach, which uses the traditional rule, was rejected
above. 21' The Second Restatement rule is similar: "A marriage which
satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted
will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage. 211 While this rule
does not permit a state with a tenuous connection to a dispute to reject the
validity of a marriage on public policy grounds, it shares the remainder of
the FirstRestatement's flaws.
Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis is a forum-favoring
212
method of choice of law that basically comprises a two-step analysis.
First, a court must determine which states have an "interest" in adopting
their laws.2 1 ' A court does this by establishing whether a state has a relation
to the case that provides a legitimate basis for it to assert an interest in the
application of its policy. 214 Second, if two or more states have an interest
their laws (a true conflict), then the court should adopt forum
in applying
215
law.
Under Currie's method, the validity of a marriage will usually depend
on which state adjudicated the validity. First, both the place of celebration
and the couple's domicile have an interest in the validity of a marriage.
The place of the marriage has an interest in marriages that are celebrated

205. See Kramer, supra note 88, at 1998-99.
206. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 126, § 377.

207. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 311.
208. See CURREE, supra note 143.
209. See JUENGER, supra note 130, at 191-237, ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS

LAW 197-222 (3d ed. 1977).
210. See supra notes 108-76 and accompanying text.
211. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 283(2).
212. See CURRIE, supra note 143, at 183-84.

213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
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in its territory, while a couple's domicile has an interest in regulating its
domiciliaries' marriages. Since there is a true conflict, the court will select
forum law.21 6
The rule for marriages under Currie's system violates both the
normative and constitutional criteria set forth above. First, the choice of
law for the validity of marriages under Currie's method is not forum
neutral; the outcome will hinge on the jurisdiction in which the validity of
the marriage is adjudicated. The validity of a marriage, however, should
not depend on choice of forum. As stated above, parties need to know
whether a marriage is valid, and such a rule destroys the predictability of
marriages. Second, Currie's method is unfair to the parties. While Currie's
method is usually plaintiff favoring because the plaintiff usually chooses
the forum, it may not be in connection with marriages because the parties
will often be forced to litigate the incidents of marriage in their current
domicile. Moreover, third parties, such as persons who might inherit from
a member of the same-sex couple, would have the outcome of his or her
case depend on choice of forum. Finally, Currie's method does not
correctly consider the interests of the states. While the first step of his
method is based on state interests, its forum-favoring second step allows
a state's law to govern any time a state has a colorable interest, even if
another state has a much stronger interest that should prevail.217
Currie's method in general and the result of his method for the validity
of marriages should be unconstitutional.2 The automatic choice of forum
law whenever there is a true conflict violates both the Due Process Clause
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. As stated above, this author believes
that an individual has a due process right not to have the law of a state with
a tenuous connection to a controversy govern his or her conduct, which is
often the result under Currie's forum-favoring method. In addition, the
unpredictability of Currie's system deprives an individual of notice of what

210. See id. at 184.
217. Currie said of his method that
[t]here remains the stubborn fact that under any conceivable conflict-of-laws
method the interests of one state will be sacrificed to those of another whenever
there is conflict. The only virtue of the method proposed here is that it at least
makes the choice of interests on a rational and objective basis: the forum
consistently applies its own law in case of conflict, and thus at least advances its
domestic policy.
Id. at 169. This author, however, believes his method better protects the interests of the states. See
supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the constitutionality of Currie's method in general, see Fruehwald,
supra note 187, at 77-82. Douglas Laycock comes to a similar conclusion. See Laycock, supra note
88, at 274-88, 310-12.
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conduct is legal or illegal, as is required by the Due Process Clause.2 19
Deborah Henson points out that "[p]arties make emotional and financial
plans of the most serious nature in reliance upon their marital status, and
this factor could have devastating effects upon the children of the parties
or children of any parties they may subsequently remarry."22
The outcome under Currie's approach for the validity of marriages also
violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Under a forum-favoring
approach, a state can adopt its law and ignore another's state's law, even
when that other state has a significantly closer connection to the marriage.
Such a result ignores the sovereignty of the state most interested
in the
221
dispute, a result that violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The better rule approach also contravenes the normative and
constitutional criteria set forth above.222 First, the better rule approach is
sometimes not grounded in positive law. There is no requirement under the
better rule approach that a court choose a law that the lawmaker intended
to apply to the controversy; all that is required is that the court select the
better rule. Thus, the approach invokes "a general common law not derived
from any sovereign."" Since in a modem world all law must be positive
law, the better rule approach is unacceptable, particularly with the validity
of a marriage, which depends on statutes for its existence.
Second, a better rule approach is deliberately not substantively neutral.
This lack of substantive neutrality leads to the problems noted in Part I,
where one side argues that their rule is the better rule and the other side
that theirs is. However, there is no objective criteria to determine whether
recognizing or not recognizing same-sex marriages is the better rule. As
Professor Laycock has declared, "There is no higher authority, no lawgiver
in the sky, empowered to decide which state's laws is better. 2 24 Such a
choice is a policy decision that should be made by the legislature, not a
judge who lacks the tools and authority to make this decision. 2 5 Third, as

219. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589,1598 (1996); see also Fruehwald, supra
note 187, at 71, 80-81, 84-85. "It is said that one of emperor Nero's nasty practices was to post his
edicts high on the columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to transgress." Scalia,
supra note 192, at 1179.
220. Henson, supra note 20, at 575.
221. See supra notes 195-201. As Professor Laycock has declared, "[e]liminating forum
preference altogether is the only constitutional solution." Laycock, supra note 88, at 311.
222. There are many variations on the better rule approach. For example, Professor Leflar's
method looks at several factors other than the better rule, while Professor Juenger uses only the
better rule. See JUENGER, supra note 130, at 88-150; LEFLAR, supra note 209, at 197-222. Since
most better rule approaches, including Leflar's, use the better rule as the deciding criteria, the
differences among the better rule methods are not significant for this analysis.
223. Laycock, supra note 88, at 312.
224. Id.
225. See DWORKIN, supra note 178, at 243-44 and accompanying text.
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noted above,22 6 since judges normally find their state's law to be the better
law, the better rule approach is usually not forum neutral.
Fourth, because the outcome under the better rule approach depends on
the judge who is deciding the case, this approach is not predictable. Such
unpredictability is unfair to litigants. In addition, while justice in an
individual case is important, as noted above, so is a party's right to know
the applicable law before the fact. 227
Finally, the better rule approach shows no respect for the states'
interests. Under this approach, all that matters is some abstract, supposedly
universal sense ofjustice. However, "[i]f each state is equal in authority to
the other forty-nine, then no state is required to conform its law to that of
the others, or to follow the trend that other states find more in keeping with
the times."' Accordingly, this approach ignores the reality of political
subdivisions and the fact that those political subdivisions may have
differing values.
The better rule approach to the validity of marriages is also
unconstitutional under both the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses.229 First, this approach often permits the law of a state with a
tenuous connection to a dispute to govern that dispute, thus violating the
Due Process Clause. Permitting the law of a state with a tenuous
connection to a marriage and the incidents of that marriage to control is
obviously unacceptable. Equally important, the approach's arbitrariness
and lack of predictability contravenes due process to an even greater extent
than does Currie's forum-centered system; at least under Currie's method,
one could determine the applicable law once the forum was established. As
mentioned above, the need for predictability is especially acute in
connection with marriages.
Similarly, better rules methods violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The lack of respect for states' interests and sovereignty mentioned above
in connection with the normative criteria disregards the existence of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. While one might argue for the better rule
when only independent nations are involved, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause precludes a better rule method for American states because of the
need to respect other states' sovereignty and laws. This is particularly true
when a state's values are contravened, as might be true if a couple's
domicile was forced to accept a same-sex marriage when the couple spent
only a few hours inthe state of celebration.
In sum, this author believes that the major existing choice of law

226. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
228. Laycock, supra note 88, at 312.
229. For a discussion of the constitutionality ofbetter rule methods in general, see Fruehwald,
supra note 187, at 82-85; Laycock, supra note 88, at 312-15.
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systems do not offer a solution to the validity of same-sex marriage or
marriage in general. While this writer does not claim that his method is the
only possible one, this author does contend that a choice of law rule
concerning the validity of same-sex marriage should be substantively and
forum neutral in order not to infringe on a state's right to decide its own
values within constitutional limitations.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND THE
INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE

As demonstrated above, a state will have to recognize same-sex
marriages celebrated in a couple's domicile even if the state does not
recognize such marriages and even if such marriages are against that state's
public policy. In such a circumstance, does a state have to give the
incidents of marriage to the same-sex marriage? 20 As Barbara Cox has
pointed out, "We will then ask our employers to enroll us as a married
couple for health insurance, ask our lawyer to write our wills as a married
couple, apply for marital discounts at our health clubs, move into a singlefamily neighborhood, filejoint tax returns as a married couple, and perhaps
' As the dissent in Baehr observed this "will have farchange our names."231
reaching and grave repercussions on the finances and policies of the
230. A detailed discussion as to whether the federal government will or must provide benefits
to same-sex couples is beyond the scope of this Article on state choice of law. A section of DOMA
precludes giving federal benefits to same-sex couples:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress or any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996). Thus, under DOMA, federal benefits extend only to heterosexual couples, even
if a same-sex couple's home state has recognized their union.
Some advocates of same-sex marriage have argued that this section of DOMA is
unconstitutional. See Andrew Koppleman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of MarriageAct
Is Unconstitutional,83 IOWAL. REV. 1,4-5 (1997); Christopher T. Nixon, Should CongressRevise
the Tax Code to Extend the Same Tax Benefits to Same-Sex Couples as Are Currently Grantedto
Married Couples?: An Analysis in Light of HorizontalEquity, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 41, 63 (1998);
Christopher J. Hayes, Note, MarriageFilingJointly:FederalRecognitionof Same-Sex Marriages
Underthe InternalRevenue Code, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1593,1623-25 (1996); Kevin H. Lewis, Note,
Equal Protectionafter Romer v. Evans: Implicationsfor the Defense of MarriageAct and Other
Laws, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 178 (1997); Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionalityof the
Defense of MarriageAct in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263, 265-341
(1997). This author, however, believes that this part of DOMA is constitutional for the same
reasons that states can deny the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples married in other states
without violating the Constitution. See infra notes 262-93 and accompanying text.
231. Cox, supra note 20, at 1040.
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governments
and industry of this state and all the other states in the
232
country."
The state incidents of marriage include taxation advantages, inheritance
rights, health benefits, the right to enter into pre-marital agreements, postdivorce rights, child custody rights, spousal support, real property rights,
the right to recover for the wrongful death of a spouse, workers
compensation rights, consortium claims, and the right to cohabitate.233
Robert Cordell has declared that
there are a multitude of advantages and privileges that come
with marital status in this country. Even for everyday
activities in our society, like renting a car (the spouse of the
renter is automatically covered on the rental agreement) or
announcing an engagement and impending marriage in the
newspaper, the right to marriage is extremely important.234
Judge Posner, however, has observed that the incidents of a traditional
marriage may not translate well to a same-sex marriage: "These incidents
of marriage were designed with heterosexual marriage in mind, more
specifically heterosexual marriages resulting in children. They may or may
not fit the235case of homosexual marriage; they are unlikely to fit it
perfectly."
Modem choice of law generally recognizes that courts can apply
different states' laws to different issues in the same lawsuit (d6pegage).2 36
Such an approach is proper "when the choice-influencing considerations
differ as they apply to different issues."237 Is d6pegage proper for the
validity of a marriage and the incidents of that marriage?
While courts have often applied the same state's law to both the validity
and incidents of a marriage, some scholars have advocated that courts
should evaluate marital status on an issue by issue basis. 238 For example,

232. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,74 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting); see also RICHARD
A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 313 (1992) ("Authorizing homosexual marriage would have many
collateral effects, simply because marriage is a status rich in entitlements.").
233. See Grace Ganz Bloomberg, CohabitationWithout Marriage:A Different Perspective,
28 UCLAL. REV. 1125, 1126 (1981); Cordell, supra note 20, at 255-57; Henson, supra note 20,
at 556-57.
234. Cordell, supra note 20, at 257 (citations omitted).
235. POSNER, supra note 232, at 313.
236. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, § 195; LEFLAR, supra note 209, at 195;
SCOLFS & HAY, supra note 22, at 35.
237. LEFLAR, supra 209, at 221-22.
238. See, e.g., Hans W. Baade, Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law:
Governmental-InterestsAnalysis and the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV. 329, 356-57
(1972); David E. Engdahl, Proposalfora Benign Revolution in Marriageand MarriageConflicts
Law, 55 IOwA L. REv. 56, 103-16 (1969); J. David Fine, The Application of Issue-Analysis to
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Professor Engdahl has written that
[i]n a conflicts setting, the villain of the piece appears as the
principle of universality... [tihe principle of universality
requires as its prerequisite a certain conceptualization of
marriage-the view that the status "marriage" even for the
purposes of a single system of law is a unitary tertium quid
distinct from the rights, duties, capacities or incapacities
which are premised upon it.... If this conceptualization of
marriage is unsound, then.., the universality principle must
be unsound[,] ... the fundamental error of this conception.

. is the failure to recognize that even within a single system

the same word, "marriage,...

in the law is not one, but

many [conceptions].... On this view, it is erroneous to
collect all the rights attributed to "marriage" and regard them
as a single status; for the classeg of persons upon which these
several rights are conferred are not the same.239
A frequent practice in the courts when considering whether to grant a
marital incident to a marriage that contravenes state policy is to determine
whether the prohibition against the marriage is strong enough in relation
to the particular issue to prevail over the contravailing policy upholding
marriage and related policies, such as not relieving one from an obligation
solemnly entered in to, long-standing family expectations, and the
legitimacy of children born of the union.' For example, a marriage which
might be valid for succession might be invalid in an annulment suit."
For instance, In re DalipSingh Bir's Estate2A 2 concluded that a state's
policy against polygamous marriages was not strong enough to overcome
a widow's right to share in her husband's estate.243 In this case, the
deceased died leaving two wives, who he had married legally in India.2"
The two widows jointly petitioned the court to award them one half share
each in the deceased's estate, as legal widows of the deceased.245 The trial
court held that since allowing the second wife a share would violate
California's public policy against polygamy, only the first wife could

ChoiceofLaw Involving FamilyLaw Matters in the UnitedStates,26 LOYOLAL. REV. 31,295-320
(1980); Willis L. M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflicts Law, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 952

(1977).
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Engdahl, supra note 238, at 106-08 (footnotes omitted).
See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 448.
See Reese, supra note 238, at 961.
188 P.2d 499 (Cal. App. 1948).
See id. at 502.
See id. at 499.
See id.
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take." 6 An appellate court reversed on the ground that the policy against
polygamous marriages applied only to cohabitation with two wives in
California and not to the descent of property.247 The court concluded that
"'[p]ublic policy' would not be affected by dividing the money equally
between the two wives, particularly since there is no contest between them
and they are the only interested parties. 248
Similarly, In re Estate of Lenherr249 balanced Pennsylvania's policy
forbidding certain marriages against the policy favoring uniformity of
results in connection with the validity of marriages.' 0 The issue in Lenherr
was whether a Pennsylvania court would recognize a West Virginia
marriage for the purpose of the marital exemption to the Pennsylvania
Inheritance Tax, which allows a spouse to inherit from the other spouse
without imposition of the tax."1 The couple had previously been married
to other persons in Pennsylvania, and both their divorce proceedings had
named the other as having had an adulterous relationship with each
other. 2 Under Pennsylvania law (section 169), a husband or wife who has
been guilty of adultery may not marry the person with whom that person
committed adultery during the life of the former spouse.2 3 Consequently,
the couple went to West Virginia, which allowed such unions, to be
married, and they returned to Pennsylvania to live as husband and wife. 4
The Commonwealth contended that based on the aforementioned statute,
it should not recognize the marriage for the purpose of the marital
exemption. z5
The court noted that, although the marriage was forbidden under
Pennsylvania law, there was a strong policy favoring uniformity of results
in relation to marital status.2- 6 The court declared "[i]n resolving that
conflict, we must realize that the strength of the policy behind section 169
... is [not] so strong that it must be given extraterritorial effect in this case,
thereby destroying the uniformity of result which is so desirable in a case
concerning the recognition of a marriage that is valid in the state where it
was contracted." 7 The court noted that the strength of the policy against
certain marriages hinges on the incident of the marriage being

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See id.
See id. at 502.
Id.
314 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974).
See id. at 258.
See id. at 256.
See id.
See id. at 257.
See id.
See id. at 256.
See id. at 257-58.
Id. at 258.
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adjudicated.' 8 The court thought that section 169 was intended not as a
penalty upon the adulterous parties, but "to protect the sensibility of the
injured spouse" because the provision was limited to the injured spouse's
lifetime. 9 Accordingly, the court felt that the policy behind section 169
was not furthered by denying the marital exemption because denying the
exemption could neither deter the adulterous conduct nor spare the injured
spouse from the effrontery of the marriage. 2 °
Although I have argued elsewhere that some choice of law systems
sometimes improperly split legal relations that the lawmaker meant to
belong together,261 I believe that if the appropriate lawmaker intended to
separate the validity of the marriage from the incidents of marriage, it is
proper for a court to apply different states' laws to different issues relating
to a marriage. In, addition, this author can find no constitutional reason to
prohibit separating the validity of a marriage from the incidents of
i argue that the Equal Protection Clause forbids such
marriage. 2621oe
Some will
separation-the state is giving benefits to one group, heterosexual married
couples, while denying them to a similarly-situated group, homosexual
married couples. However, since homosexuals are not a protected group,263
a court will apply rational basis analysis to this question and probably find
that there is a rational basis for the different treatment.
The Supreme Court has declared that "the Equal Protection Clause
requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.,, 264 It has similarly
asserted that "[i]f the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not
offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with
2
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results-in some inequality." 6
The rational basis test does not even require the legislature to state the
statute's purpose. As Justice Rehnquist explains,
Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress'
actions, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course,
"constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact
underlay the legislative decision," because this Court has

258. See id.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 259.
261. See Fruehwald, supra note 130, at 367.
262. In addition, Linda Silberman has written that "while a state might be constitutionally
prohibited from applying its own law when it has no interest, a new domiciliary state does have a
relationship with parties justifying the application of its own rules when determining to whom it
will extend benefits." Silberman, supra note 183, at 203 (footnote omitted).
263. Cf.Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
264. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442 (1985).
265. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (citing Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
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never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for
enacting a statute.... The "task of classifying persons for...
benefits... inherently requires that some persons who have
an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed
on different sides of the line," and the fact that the line might
have been drawn different at some points is a matter of
legislative, rather than judicial, consideration."z
Denying the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples can be justified
on several grounds. First, a state may be upholding what it considers to be
the traditional institution of marriage. As Professor Wardle has asserted,
"[Blecause the [heterosexual] relations themselves are uniquely valuable
they are given the preferred status and label of marriage."2 67 Similarly, as
Singer v. Hara' declared, "[A]lthough ...married persons are not
required to have children or even to engage in sexual relations, marriage
is so clearly related to the public interest in affording a favorable
environment for the growth of children that we are unable to say that there
is not a rational basis upon which the state may limit the protection of its
marriage laws to the legal union of one man and one woman."26 9 While
some may consider the above to be unfair or unwise, it still constitutes a
rational basis for such a classification. As stated earlier, a court cannot look
at the wisdom of legislation as long as it has a rational basis. Second, a
state may be allocating limited benefits by using traditional categories.
Representative Weldon stated during the debate on DOMA: "I think it
would be wrong to take money out of the pockets of working families
across America and use those tax dollars to give Federal acceptance and
financial support to same-sex marriages.""27 Third, while a state may not
want to criminalize homosexual conduct, it may not want to put its stamp
of approval on it by giving the incidents of marriage to same-sex
marriages. Saying that a state should not criminalize certain conduct is not
the same as saying a state should extend benefits to that conduct.271 Finally,
a state may feel that it should not force employers to pay benefits to a new
group of beneficiaries because it may cause those employers economic
hardship.
Some may argue, however, that the right to marry is a fundamental right
so a court should evaluate any restriction on the right to marry or the right
to obtain the incidents of marriage under strict scrutiny. The Supreme

266. Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
267. Wardle, supra note 18, at 39 (footnote omitted).
268. 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
269. Id. at 1197.
270. 142 Cong. Rec. H7493 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
271. See POSNER, supra note 232, at 311-12 ('To say that an act is not a crime is not to
commend it.").
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Court has held that marriage is a fundamental right, at least in some
circumstances. After striking down a Virginia miscegenation statute on
equal protection grounds in Loving v. Virginia,72 the Supreme Court also
found the statute invalid on due process grounds, declaring that
"[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our
very existence and survival." 273 Zablocki v. Redhai 274 reaffirmed that
'
marriage is "of fundamental importance to all individuals."27
The Court
then asserted that marriage is a part of the right to privacy recognized in
27 6 However, the Court also declared that "we do
Griswold v. Connecticut.
not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to
the incidents
or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous
'2
scrutiny.
The problem with arguing that same-sex marriage is a fundamental
right is that the courts in the above cases were talking about heterosexual
marriages; the couples involved in those cases were heterosexual couples.
Even if the cases were speaking in broad terms, they were talking about
traditional marriages. As Baker v. Nelson278 declared, "there is a clear
distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one
based upon the fundamental difference in sex." 279 While proponents of
same-sex marriage argue that defining marriage as a union between a man
and a woman is circular reasoning,28 the fact remains that this is the
traditional meaning of marriage, and there is no reason to assume that the
Court had any other definition in mind when it used the term. For example,
Webster's Dictionarydefines marriage as "the state of being united to a
person of the opposite sex as husband or wife.., the mutual relation of
husband and wife." 21 Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines
marriage as "the condition of being a husband and wife. 22 The definition
of marriage as being heterosexual is the same in the law:
272. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
273. Id. at 12.
274. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
275. Id. at 384; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987).
276. See Zablocki,434U.S. at 384-85 (citingGriswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
277. Id.at 386.
278. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
279. Id. at 187 (holding that denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple did not violate
the Constitution); see Singerv. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,1191-92,1196 (stating that"[a]ppellants were
not denied a marriage license because of their sex; rather, they were denied a marriage license
because of the nature of marriage itself'); Wardle, supra note 18, at 38-39.
280. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage,79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1495 (1993).
281. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1384 (3d ed. 1971); see also THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OFTHE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1102 (3d ed. 1992) ("[The legal

union of man and woman as husband and wife.").
282. THE COMPACT EDmON OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 180 (2d ed. 1971).
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"[M]arriage" may be defined as the civil status of one man
and one woman, capable of contracting, united by contract
and mutual consent for life, for the discharge, to each other
and to the community, of the duties legally incumbent on
those2 3 whose association is founded on the distinction of
sex.

One court has even refused to grant a marriage license to a male and a
post-operative male to female transsexual on the ground that the criteria for
marriage is biological.'
Finally, it would be hard to reconcile Zablocki's assertion that marriage
is covered under the right of privacy with Bower's holding there is no
constitutional right of privacy for homosexual conduct, if marriage
included same-sex marriage. Zablocki expanded on marriage as part of the
right to privacy:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed
on the same level of importance as decisions relating to
procreation, childbirth, child rearing; and family relationships.
...[It would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy
with respect to other matters of family life and not with
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the
foundation of the family in our society.... Surely, a decision
to marry and raise a child in a traditional family setting must
receive equivalent protection. And, if appellee's right to
procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to
enter the only relationship in which the state of Wisconsin
allows sexual relations legally to take place. 28
Considering the reference to procreation, childbirth, childrearing, and
traditional family relationships in the above, it is hard to argue that the
283. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 2 (1998); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 972 (6th ed. 1990)

("Legal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife.").
284. See In re Landrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987). The court cited an English
case, which stated,
Having regard to the essentially heterosexual character of the relationship which
is called marriage, the criteria must, in my judgment, be biological, for even the
most extreme degree of transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal
imbalance which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads and
male genitalia, cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable of performing
the essential role of a woman in marriage.
Id. at 832 (citing Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306, 1324-25 (P. 1970)).
285. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
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right of privacy applies to same-sex marriages, which lack these
characteristics.
Some scholars have argued that denying the right to marry or the
incidents of marriage to same-sex couples is unconstitutional under Romer
v. Evans.286 In Romer, the Court struck down a Colorado referendum that
amended that state's constitution to preclude all legislative, executive, or
judicial action at any level of government that is designed to protect the
status of persons based on their homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices, or relations on the ground that the
amendment failed the rational basis test under the equal protection
clause.2 7 The main reason the amendment failed the rational basis test was
that it was too broad and that this sheer breadth indicated an animus to the
class it affected.28 Justice Kennedy declared:
It is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by
a single trait and then denied them protection across the
board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons
from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
unprecedented in our jurisprudence.2 9
He continued that "Amendment 2, however, in making a general
announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular
protections from the law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real
injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justification that may be
claimed for it." 2' 9
Romer probably has no effect on whether a state may withhold the
incidents of marriage from a same-sex couple. First, such state laws lack
the overbreadth of the amendment in Romer. As Professor Duncan has
declared, "Marriage laws do not target a class of persons and deny that
class the opportunity to protect itself politically against a limitless number
of discriminatory harms and exclusions."2' 91 Professor Duncan has also
pointed out that "[v]arious Justices expressed concern that under the
Amendment homosexuals would be helpless to protect themselves against
exclusions from public libraries, police protection, and even life-saving

286. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). See Koppleman, supranote 230, at 1; Jon-Peter Kelly, Note, Act
of Infidelity: Why the Defense of MarriageAct Is Unfaithful to the Constitution,7 CoRNELL J. L.
&PUB. POL'Y 203,247-49 (1997); Lewis, supranote 230, at 175-78; Robb, supranote 230, at 299341.
287. SeeRomer, 116 S.Ctat 1628-29.
288. See id. at 1627.
289. Id.at 1628.
290. Id at 1628-29.
291. Duncan, supra note 45, at 251.
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treatment at public hospitals." 29 Significantly, those "ineligible to marry
are not forbidden from using the political process to change the marriage
laws."2'93 Second, state marriage laws denying the incidents of marriage to
same-sex couples who were married in other states do not withdraw a right
from same-sex couples; they never had the right to the incidents of
marriage in that state. Finally, as was demonstrated above, there are several
reasonable justifications under the rational basis test for denying the
incidents of marriage to same-sex couples.294
Despite the above, this writer contends that states should grant certain
incidents of marriage to same-sex couples, such as the right of succession
and the right to make medical decisions for same-sex partners who are
unable to do so themselves, because such benefits do not significantly
impinge on a state's policy against same-sex marriages and they are
costless to the state. However, this argument is a normative one; as stated
above, there is nothing that requires a state to bestow the incidents of
marriage on a same-sex couple.
Other scholars have asserted the impracticality of having different rules
for the validity and incidents of marriage. For example, Professor Cox has
stated that "if our [same-sex] couple is denied the opportunity to determine
their 'universal' marital status for all incidents of marriage, they must
relitigate their marital status repeatedly as they request recognition of their
marriage for each incident. This is an untenable prospect and would be
unacceptable for other couples."295 While Professor Cox's argument has
some persuasiveness, again, it is a normative argument that cannot be used
to force a state to give the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples.
In sum, this author believes that a state can deny the incidents of
marriage to a same-sex couple married elsewhere under both choice of law
criteria and constitutional constraints. It is a part of state sovereignty to
decide who receives the benefits of a state's laws and dollars, as long as the
decision is made within constitutional limits.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that state choice of law for same-sex marriage
should follow the principles of the new structural approach to
constitutional adjudication and make the choice of law selection based on
content and forum neutral criteria. Accordingly, this author has proposed
that the choice of law rule for the validity of same-sex marriages should be
that, when two states' laws could apply, a court should choose the law of

292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 250.
Id. at 251.
See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
Cox, supra note 20, 1063 n.168.
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the state that has the closest connection to the validity of the marriage.
Thus, when the state of celebration authorizes same-sex marriages, but the
couple's domicile does not, the domicile does not have to recognize the
validity of the marriage because it has the closest connection to the
marriage. However, when the state of celebration and the couple's
domicile is the same and that state has legalized same-sex marriage, other
states will have to recognize that marriage. Because a state can separate the
validity of a marriage from the incidents of a marriage, a state does not
have to give its incidents of marriage to a same-sex couple who were
married in another state.
While this author believes that states should grant gays and lesbians
greater rights under principles of liberal toleration, that decision is left up
to each individual state under the structure of our federal union and our
Constitution. Although some may disagree with the results under this
Article's methodology, it is true to the concept of neutrality of the new
judicial activism. As Judge Wilkinson declared: "If one remains attentive
to the pitfalls of the past, the present jurisprudence holds the promise to be
an enduring and constructive one, for its aims and means differ
significantly from those of prior eras." 2

296. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820,893 (4th Cir. 1999).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss5/2

52

